has become a focal point of public policy. In the last ten years it appears to have gained a permanent place in the public policy agenda. We have just gone through a long debate over what is the latest piece of immigration legisla tion, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. While that legislation was defeated, or at least tabled, it is almost certain that there will be another piece of immigration legislation in the coming Congress. So it is largely to that debate, raised by the im migration reform legislation, and in light of a series of research projects that began with that study of Puerto Rican migration but extended from there to the issue of migration in general, that I would like to address my remarks.
The Illegal Immigration Problem
The central concern in the public debate has largely been clandestine immigration. Estimates of the number of people in the country without proper documents range from 3 to 12 million. 1 Interestingly enough, those figures the 3 and the 12 million have remained constant over the ten-year period. Most of these people are here to work, hence the no tion that they take jobs from Americans. The rhetoric of the immigration debate implies that, in addition, the existence of so many people here in direct contradiction to announced public policy, represents a threat to the general social order and hence to the safety and security of the rest of us. Their ambiguous legal status certainly places the people themselves in a precarious social position. It makes it difficult to educate their children, to obtain the protection of labor legislation in the workplace, or off the job to obtain protec tion from the abuses of landlords, moneylenders or the wrath of angry relatives and neighbors or rejected suitors, all of whom can at any moment in time turn them in to the im migration authorities.
The dominant view about this immigration appears to be that the immigrants are driven by a desperate attempt to escape the poverty and depression of their own countries, which constitutes an inexorable force driving them towards the United States. This view is not always made explicit but it underlies the continual reference to the economic conditions in places like Mexico, to the population pressures in the underdeveloped world, and to the high unemployment rates or so-called underemployment in these areas. Given the fact that the United States is surrounded by poverty, it implies that we will be inundated with immigrants. When figures about income levels and population growth along our southern border are presented in combination with the figures about the numbers of clandestine immigrants already here, it seems that we are already being inundated.
Alternative Policies to Control Illegal Immigration
This notion of the immigration process invites a policy of massive retaliation. To halt the invasion in this way, one would have to control the two major streams of clandestine immigration. One of those streams consists of people who enter without inspection, that is, basically, cross the border. The second group consists of a group called "visa violators'* who enter with documents, largely tourist documents but some student visas, and then violate the conditions of those visas either by working while they are here or by staying after the visas have expired.
Border Control: In principle, true border control is prob ably possible. The U.S.-Mexican border is very long, but most of it consists of desert which is difficult to cross and easy to police with aerial equipment. Most of the entry oc curs in large urban areas. The present border control force is small. As the former Labor Secretary, Ray Marshall, was fond of pointing out, the border patrol, in fact, is smaller than the Capitol Hill police force. Current smuggling opera tions are relatively primitive and unorganized. More resources alone would go a long way to counter those opera tions.
On the other hand, the whole nature of the immigration process undoubtedly changes under the impact of a massive control operation. There would be an escalation both in the technology and the organizational efforts on the other side of the border and probably a change in the locus of entry. Border patrol would thus undoubtedly be considerably more expensive than it appears to be at the current time. The final cost in terms of resources, not to mention human rights, could be quite large. But in my own judgment, if the control activity were done with a well-conceived and carefully im plemented organizational structure, that is to say, if it were not done in panic, it could probably be pulled off.
Visa Controls: Visa violations, on the other hand, are a good deal more difficult to control. Almost all visa violators come to the United States for ostensibly legitimate reasons: to visit relatives, for tourism, shopping and for education. Attempts to curtail visa violations by tightening up the pro cedures through which visas are granted inevitably interfere with these processes in very serious ways. The consulates who issue visas are overworked and understaffed and could easily absorb more resources. But it is not clear that more resources alone would solve this problem. Resource con straints seem, in fact, to be one of the major factors control ling the number of visas actually issued at the moment. More resources would probably make the process fairer, but might actually increase the flow. It is very difficult to judge the ac tual motivation of an applicant, and since many of those who eventually violate their visas have legitimate reasons for visiting the United States and may not even contemplate visa violation in advance, it is not clear that the process could be fully controlled in this way. I think it is important to note that a lot of students who end up violating their visas really do come here for education and change their minds only after they get here about whether or not they want to stay. That's probably even more true of visitors who come from foreign countries to visit friends and relatives and then somehow stay longer than they intended, getting a job to finance their extended stay.
Employer Controls: The difficulties of direct control, the hopelessness of controlling visa violation, and the cost of border control have forced attention on a third pro posal employer liability. By a quirk in the immigration legislation employers are in no way responsible for checking the legal status of their employees. Reformers have argued and this is one of the central provisions of virtually every bill that has been proposed, including the SimpsonMazzoli bill that if employers were made responsible for verifying the legal working status of employees, the jobs which are the chief attraction for the immigrants would be cut off, and immigration would dry up.
It is probably true that this would be the case, but job con trol is no panacea. The exact nature of present employers' liability has been somewhat distorted by the advocates of this reform. Employers are not, it is true, liable for having un documented workers on their payroll, but they are liable if they actively and knowingly engage in recruitment. Such recruitment has at times been fairly widespread although very circumspect. The immigration service has not been very successful in developing cases against this kind of recruit ment, largely because such cases are difficult to prove without extensive investigation which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) does not have the resources to conduct. More stringent forms of liability would reduce the investigative burden, but only marginally.
For really effective enforcement, employers would have to have some means of verifying the status of the job applicant. This would necessitate a national identity card which poses apparently insurmountable civil rights problems. Such a system would also be very expensive. Budget estimates run to several billions of dollars. By themselves, therefore, employer sanctions are unlikely to have much of an effect one way or another. To be effective they would require a massive infusion of resources for the immigration service. These resources would be almost as effective under present legislation if they were devoted to investigations and Im migration and Naturalization Service raids of existing employers, but we have consistently judged the cost of all these activities to be too great. Thus, there is a sense in which the flood of immigrants, which the conventional view predicts, seems inevitable. American culture seems doomed to either drown in a sea of foreign languages and alien customs, or to degenerate as the immigrants drive down our standard of living and we divert increasing resources to securing our borders and make progressive compromises on our basic human values in order to keep aliens out.
Fortunately, however, there is very little evidence to sup port the theory which underlies the conventional wisdom. It seems logical that the income gap between the United States and the underdeveloped world should be the basic governor of the immigration process. But that does not, in fact, seem to be the case. The migrants are not coming from the poorest countries in the world and they are not coming from the poorest regions in their countries of origin. This remains true even when some effort is made to correct the figures for the cost of transportation or even information about job pro spects. Mexican migrants to the United States, for example, come from places like Jalisco in the middle of the country and from Mexico City, not from the relatively poor Yucatan. The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere is Haiti. It has been the poorest for many, many years, but until quite recently Haiti was not a principal source of migrant workers and historically and to a lesser extent even now, the Haitian migration is primarily composed of the relatively well-to-do and well-educated middle class.
Conventional Migration Theory Fails to Explain Present and Past Rates of Immigration
Any theory of migration must explain its timing. The cur rent wave of clandestine migration is recent. It dates from the late 1960s. A large income differential between the United States and the countries of origin has, however, always existed and if anything has probably been narrowing over the last ten years. Nor is it possible to account for the recent migration flows through other changes in the cost dif ferential. Transportation costs, for example, have been remarkably stable over long periods of time. The cost of air transportation from the Caribbean in the early 1970s (and that's the period when immigration seems to have really begun) is approximately the same percentage of the unskilled worker's weekly wage as the cost of steamship passage from Italy in the 1880s.
Insofar as I can judge from talking to immigrants, the im migration process does not work as the conventional wisdom presumes because the potential immigrants view the United States much as Americans view the immigrants. The im migrants are deeply attached to their language and culture and strongly rooted in their own communities where they feel comfortable and at home. They find American society cold and alien, strange, lonely and frightening. Their migra tion is thus not a sign of the special attraction of the United States, but paradoxically of a commitment to their home community. Generally, they have some particular project at home which motivates the migration process: Landholdings which they would like to expand or improve, agricultural equipment or livestock they plan to purchase, an interurban taxi or hack, a small store, in some areas a piece of industrial equipment for a home factory. Their notion is to come to the United States temporarily, work hard for a relatively short period of time, and then return home using the accumulated earnings to finance their project. 2 This, incidently, is true not just of the current migration, but it has been true historically as well. Late nineteenth cen tury migrants from southern and eastern Europe seem to have come from areas of small land holdings where projects to expand or improve agriculture were widespread among the peasantry. The rates of return or rate of emigration among these early migrants were quite high, overall 32 per cent of all immigrants between 1908 and 1910 (a period for which we have complete figures) returned. 3 For some groups the rate was much higher. Sixty-three percent of northern Italian migrants to the United States and 56 percent of the southern Italians, for example, went home in that period. The fact that immigrants are motivated in this way limits the range of jobs for which employers find them attractive. They're not attractive for jobs to which adult national workers normally aspire. Such jobs require a long-term com mitment on the part of the labor force, high levels of educa tion, training and experience, and a stable regular labor force commitment.
The Secondary Labor Market As an Explanation for Immigration
Thus, the immigration process tends to be governed by, and respond to what we call the secondary sector of the labor market jobs which are relatively low paying, insecure, have menial social status, and lack any career advancement. Such work is not attractive to committed national workers precise ly because it has no future and adds little to the selfdefinition and esteem of those who perform it. The im migrants are undeterred by these same characteristics because they view their stay as temporary. They plan to leave before they are laid off. They do not think of themselves as staying long enough to take advantage of career oppor tunities and they obtain their self-definition from the work they perform at home. Since it is the jobs in the secondary sector for which migrants are an attractice source of labor, it is these jobs which control the immigration process.
We do not know why the economy generates secondary jobs. A good many of the jobs which clandestine immigrants now hold were previously held by other migrant groups: first, by foreign immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and subsequently black workers migrating from the rural south. The new immigration dates from the late 1960s when unemployment, under the impact of the Vietnam War boom, reached extremely low levels. In this period, the labor reserves in the rural south were virtually exhausted and the black labor force became dominated by a second generation which had grown up in the cities. Case study evidence sug gests that this new generation, whose attitudes were crystalized by the civil rights movement, were increasingly perceived by employers as intractable and difficult, if not actually dangerous, to manage. 4 Faced with a general labor shortage and a great distrust of the existing workforce, businessmen thus began to look around for new sources of labor and they found them increasingly among foreign workers. In a number of cases the employer's efforts seemed to have been deliberate and purposeful, but they went largely unnoticed as policy focused on obtaining higher levels of jobs for blacks. In some cases businesses actually seemed to have recruited from abroad, and this was the origin of the new migration stream.
The character of an immigration stream does not, however, remain static. It changes significantly over time. Most early immigrants plan to stay only temporarily, but many end up staying longer than they intended. Some of them eventually settle permanently in the United States. Even those who finally do return often have children who grow up in the United States, cut off from their parents' country without the cultural and linguistic ties that bind their parents to the place of origin. The long-stayers and their children form a permanent settlement whose members, especially in the second generation, have needs and aspira tions which parallel those of the U.S. nationals. Indeed, for practical purposes, many are U.S. nationals whatever their legal status. Return is not a viable option.
Once a permanent community forms in the United States the character of the new migrants also begins to change. It becomes feasible to move to the United States and settle per manently without experiencing the cultural alienation and strangeness which deters this kind of migration in the begin ning and more people begin to do so. Thus, an immigration process which begins initially as essentially complementary to the needs and aspiration of U.S. nationals generates over time a second generation and a growing group of first generation immigrants who are in competition with American nationals for stable career jobs.
Where are we in this process at this time? If the recent wave of immigration began in the late 1960s, it is now almost 20 years later. The country has accumulated a substantial reserve of undocumented immigrants and the original fluid immigration stream has begun to solidify. Most of the public discussion seems to presume that this is the case. People talk as if time alone makes this problem more and more pressing. But here too, this is by no means clear. The initial upsurge of immigration in the late 1960s was a response to two factors: an unusually tight labor market with levels of unemployment much lower than any experienced since, and a relatively sud den shift in the character of the black labor force, who had previously been staffing secondary jobs. The vacuum that this created at the bottom of the labor market, into which the new immigrants were pulled, could not have been greatly ex panded since that time and with rising unemployment may actually have shrunk. In the last five years there has also been a substantial infusion of refugees. The refugees have moved into jobs very comparable to those held by un documented migrants. But, the refugees have a permanent commitment to the U.S. which the migrants do not and un doubtedly push many of the migrants out. However settled the original migrant communities have become, we know from case studies and anecdotal evidence that the numbers who are temporarily here, remain substantial. 3 Because these people are here to save money they are not interested in waiting out unemployment. They do not stay in the United States. If jobs are unavailable they go home. Indeed, as one migrant commented, "It is not worth my while to stay here if I can't hold at least two jobs." At their core, the immigrant communities may now be sufficiently solid to resist the pressure of unemployment and the competition of the refugees, but there is still a wide periphery of workers who must have responded to the changing economic conditions and the new competition by leaving the United States.
Economic troubles in Mexico are thought to be augment ing undocumented migration, but this presumption is also dubious. Nobody seems to have argued during the Mexican oil boom of the late 1970s that the undocumented migration from that country diminished. If the boom did not diminish the migration, it is unclear why the bust should augment it. However bad things are in Mexico, one can probably do bet ter there surrounded by a family and embedded in a com munity network than in the United States without a job and ineligible for unemployment insurance or social welfare. In any case, much of the argument applies to economic refugees from Mexico, as it does to political refugees from Cuba, Asia, and El Salvador. To the extent that they have a stronger motive to stay in the United States, they're likely to replace temporary migrants from other countries in the hemisphere. This displacement effect undoubtedly operates least effectively in the West where Mexicans predominate, but strongly in the Midwest and the East Coast where Mex icans are only one of an immense number of different na tional groups which make up the immigrant population.
Finally, what is almost never recognized in assessing the evolution of the clandestine immigration population is that a very large proportion of those people who do settle per manently manage to legitimize their status. The official im migration system in the United States operates through a system of equity, or preference, to give enormous weight to family reunification. The spouse, parents, and the children under the age of 21 of U.S. citizens are admitted outside the official immigration quotas. The preference system allocates 20 percent of the overall quota of 270,000 immigrants to un married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, 26 percent to unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens, 10 percent to married sons and daughters of citizens and 24 percent to brothers and sisters of citizens. Very few people develop a desire to settle permanently in an area without developing the social and family ties which would eventually qualify them for a permanent immigration visa under one or another of these various family unification provisions. In ad dition, the wives or husbands of U.S. citizens come in out side the quota system altogether. Most visa violators come to the United States as family visitors with exactly the kinds of ties which would permit them to legitimize their status initial ly. It is common practice for undocumented aliens to apply for official admission, come to the United States, live and work clandestinely while their application is pending, and then return home when it comes through to pick it up at the office. In this way, documented and undocumented migra tion are intertwined and the pool of undocumented workers is continually diminished by official migration.
The estimates of the stock of undocumented migrants have, as I said at the beginning, remained constant. That is, the range has always been three to twelve million over the whole course of this debate. It is generally supposed that this is due to the width of the range and that the true figure has moved up over time. Given rising unemployment, the com petition of refugees, and the processes of legitimization through official immigration, however, the true figure might as well have actually declined. It is in the nature of this pro cess that we can never know what the true figure is because, obviously, clandestine migrants are not volunteering infor mation about their presence in the United States.
Immigrant and Native Workers: Two Case Studies
What does this alternative view of immigration imply for public policy? The major concern of public policymakers is the threat which immigration poses to income and employ ment opportunities of American nationals. In the conven tional understanding, the immigrants constitute a generaliz ed threat. In the process just sketched out, the threat is much more limited and confined. The immigrants, at least in the early stages of the process, do not threaten the employment opportunities of permanent adult workers, particularly those in jobs requiring a long-term career commitment. Indeed, in sofar as a certain amount of menial, unskilled and unsecured workers are necessary to sustain stable, long-term job oppor tunities, the immigrants may actually complement these types of national workers. The competition occurs between the immigrants and other marginally committed labor force groups, particularly youth and secondary women workers whose primary commitment is to home and family respon sibilities. Even that kind of competition is difficult to assess. The nature of the labor force commitment of these groups is in itself ambiguous. The jobs at stake are, moreover, in com-petition with foreign producers and any attempt to replace the immigrant labor force with nationals might simply drive the work abroad.
The difficulties for analysis and policy are illustrated by two studies of New York City industries, one by Thomas Baily (1985) of the New York City restaurant industry, the second by Roger Waldinger (1985) of the New York City gar ment industry.
The Restaurant Industry: In the restaurant industry, im migrants tend to be concentrated in a distinct sector of ethnic restaurants owned and managed by immigrant en trepreneurs. This sector coexists with two other sectors the fast food sector typified by McDonald's, which is staffed primarily with young part-time workers, and full service restaurants owned by American nationals who employ some immigrants but also a certain number of nationals. Baily argues, on the basis of a comparison with other cities which have much smaller immigrant groups, that the competition between immigrants and nationals is not a direct one, but oc curs through the relative sizes of these different sectors. Without the immigrants, he argues, the fast food sector would be much larger, McDonald's would substitute for the Greek coffee shop at the bottom of the price line, and limited menu steakhouses would substitute at the top. This is partial ly a substitution of youth for immigrant labor. However, a good deal of the fast food operation is industrial. The food and equipment are prepared in remote manufacturing establishments. These establishments tend to offer relatively unskilled jobs which are accessible to immigrants. These jobs have schedules and locations which are not attractive to the youth. The manufacturing activities can, moreover, be easily performed abroad. Clearly, the jobs lost by immigrants would not be converted to youth restaurant jobs on a onefor-one basis. It is not completely clear that youth could be attracted to fill every new restaurant job created by curtail-ing immigration. The restaurants in the nonimmigrant cities which Baily examined have a dispersed population and a largely family clientele. They are located near the youth which they employ. New York City restaurants have a pro fessional and business clientele in the center city, remote from the residence of young workers.
The Garment Industry: Employment patterns in the gar ment industry are equally complicated and ambiguous. Waldinger argues that the industry in New York also caters to a particular segment of the national market. It concen trates upon the production of short runs of specialty items for a spot market. It therefore needs the large flexible sources of labor which the immigrants provide. The im migrant communities also provide a certain skill continuity which is otherwise difficult to maintain and which is par ticularly important given the type of production in which the city specializes. Outside the city, production is of a very dif ferent sort. It consists of much longer runs of the products which are more standard and/or are ordered in advance. For example, highly stylized dresses are produced in New York City, while more standardized items such as blue jeans are produced elsewhere in long-run operations. The first order of standardized garments for the season will be produced outside New York. But there will be last minute spot orders which need to be filled on short notice. These are generally produced in New York itself along with specialized orders. The long-run type of production was originally done in New York, but because it requires fewer skills, benefits from large production facilities, and supports the time delays involved in remote production, it moved out of the city during the postwar decades, first to rural areas in the U.S., and then abroad.
With the new immigration, some long-run production has come back to New York City. It is difficult to imagine the garment industry without a fashion center like New York and the spot market segment of the industry which resides there. New York's chief American competitors are Miami and Los Angeles, both of which use a similar immigrant labor force. Without any immigrants the whole industry might move abroad. The recent return of long-run produc tion to New York City has been, at the expense, in part, of farm wives in rural Pennsylvania, upstate New York, and the south, and in this case the immigrants do compete with American nationals. But it has also been at the expense of foreign production, and the domestic production which moved to New York might otherwise have moved to those foreign locations. The significance of the jobs lost to the farm wives is also debatable. Before the factories moved into these areas, most of these women had never considered working. The rural labor force was a creation of the employers, in much the same way the immigration labor force in the city is the product of employer recruiting.
To summarize, it is not clear that prohibiting the employ ment of immigrants in these industries would necessarily in crease employment of native workers. Immigrants readily substitute for a marginally committed and less skilled labor force. Employers appear reluctant to hire the mostly younger and less skilled native workers. It is likely that reducing the availability of foreign workers would only induce these employers to relocate their firms abroad.
Policy Prescriptions
Taken together, these considerations lead me to conclude that the concern which has motivated current legislative pro posals is misplaced and the legislation itself is ill-conceived. We ought, I would argue, nontheless, make an effort to limit and control the immigration process. The reason for doing so is that over a very long period of time immigration does have the capacity to erode the employment opportunities of national workers, and because generally, a tight labor market in which labor is in short supply is more conducive to social progress than a loose one.
Limit Immigration by Improving Working Conditions:
The best way to limit immigration, however, is by direct con trol over employment conditions, by raising wages and im proving working conditions of the jobs to which immigrants are attracted in the hope that this will eventually attract na tional workers in their place. Policy instruments for doing this are available in our labor standards legislation and the National Labor Relations Act. I would, therefore, rather devote the resources we are currently talking about diverting to the enforcement of immigration legislation to enforce ment of these pieces of labor legislation, and legislate reforms which would raise the minimum wage, facilitate union organization, tighten health and safety standards, and the like. I prefer this policy to tighter immigration policy because, in general, I think it is more humane more consis tent with the preservation of and respect for human rights to control jobs rather than to control people.
I also think that the immigration debate tends to become entangled in feelings of xenophobia and racism, which obscure the underlying economic interest at stake. As a result, we are systematically led to pass legislation, which when we see what its true economic costs are, we are unwill ing to enforce. A debate which focuses on the minimum wage and labor standards legislation makes these costs much more salient in the public policy debate. I take it as axiomatic that if we are unwilling to support legislation which directly raises the cost of labor we will be unwilling to enforce im migration legislation which has the effect of doing this in directly by removing the foreign labor force. It is a consistent part of this policy not only to enforce labor standards direct ly, but also to combine that kind of enforcement with en forcement of immigration legislation through periodic in-spection of establishments known to employ clandestine im migrants so as to regularly vacate the jobs, open them up to nationals and test their desirability. The decent way to do this would be to inspect worker documents and inform the employer of all employees without proper documents and to hold the employer liable if he continues to hire these people in the future.
Do Not Use Immigration Reform to Solve Basic Economic and Social Problems:
On the other hand, it would be a great mistake to see in the control of immigration a solution to any of our basic economic and social problems. This seems ob vious to me with respect to the high levels of unemployment we are currently experiencing, although, given the rhetoric surrounding the policy debate, this point is perhaps worth emphasizing. Current unemployment is the product of a deep and prolonged economic recession combined with longterm structural adjustments in the technology and interna tional competitive position of our major industries. The in creases in unemployment have concentrated among precisely those committed adult male workers who are not in competi tion with immigrants. And the low-wage, unstable, menial jobs which the immigrants hold will not substitute for the jobs these people have lost. The immigrant jobs might, it is true, ease the adjustment process of the displaced workers if they were willing to take them, but few of the displaced workers are going to be willing to accept the humiliation of such a major decline in social status for the small income in volved. The real solution to their problems will require both an economic recovery that is sustained and long lasting and training and relocation assistance to help permanently displaced workers find a dignified place within the economy.
I think it is worth emphasizing that the immigrants only accept these jobs because they think of them as temporary and because they hold them in a place so remote from the place in which they actually think of themselves as per-manently located and in which their own self-identity is an chored. A similar point can be made with respect to black youth. A number of the jobs now held by immigrants were once held by the black nationals. If the immigrants were to somehow disappear, black Americans would again take over some of their work. The immigrants, however, did not displace blacks. Employers perceived a change in black at titudes toward the work which made them difficult to manage, and recruited migrants to replace them. Black at titudes changed because an older generation, raised in the rural south with a background and motivations similar to the immigrants of today, was replaced by a new generation who grew up in northern urban areas. These younger workers associated the jobs with the inferior social status to which their race had been condemned in the United States and feared that they would be confined in them permanently through prejudice and discrimination. This process of replacement occurred almost 20 years ago in a much tighter labor market and at a time when both the political climate and the levels of welfare and social benefits were much more conducive to these attitudes than they are today. It is likely that black resistance to such work has moderated somewhat and this is the case for pressing to reopen some of these jobs. But, neither I nor, more important, the businessmen involv ed believe that the attitudes have changed substantially. The real solution to the employment problem of blacks requires not the regaining of menial, low-wage jobs, but upward mobility into high-wage, dignified work.
Do Not Interfere Directly with the Settlement of Im migrant Communities:
Finally, precisely because of the ex perience with the black revolt in the 1960s, it would be a great mistake to attempt to control immigration by directly forestalling settlement. The black movement was essentially the revolt of second generation immigrants a revolt of the children of a generation who had come out of the south who were no longer satisfied with their parents' jobs, but who did not have access to the high wages and career advancement which might have satisfied their aspirations. Prejudice and discrimination were undoubtedly major factors blocking their advancement, but the black youth of the 1960s were also poorly trained for the positions to which they aspired. The children of the new immigrants will undoubtedly view their parents' jobs in much the same way and may react in much the same way if their own advancement is similarly blocked. Any attempt to prevent their parents from settling permanently will bar the children access to the educational and cultural facilities which will enable them to fulfill their aspirations and recreate for another major portion of our population the social tensions which have surrounded black communities in the last 20 years.
In a sense, moreover, American society has a moral obligation to these children as well. They are here because we wanted the labor of their parents. In a very real sense, we recruited their parents. By so doing we made the children like us, probably more like us in terms of values and aspirations, culture and language, than their parents. Having done so, we have an obligation to treat them as we would treat our own children. If, in the process, we create competitors for our children, this may be an argument for more careful control of the use of immigrant labor in the secondary sector, but is is not a very strong argument for limiting the after effects of that immigration by pressing on the children who, like us, have nowhere else to go.
Conclusions
Rejection of the conventional policy alternatives need not imply that we accept the settlement of immigrants as in evitable and beyond our control. To the contrary, the im migration process can be limited by a variety of means. Higher wages in the secondary sector would attract nationals to jobs generally held by immigrants and thus make un necessary the active recruitment of workers from abroad. Demand for immigrants on the part of employers is an im portant explanation for the continued stock of un documented workers. Furthermore, increased wages would enable temporary immigrants to meet their target earnings more rapidly and return home before they develop perma nent attachments in the United States. The longer the residence of the immigrant the more likely he or she will develop attachments and hence the more likely temporary residency will become permanent.
Changing the current visa policy may reduce permanent immigration. Time limitations on visitors in the form of visas, paradoxically, encourage longer stays and cause many visitors to remain permanently, albeit illegally, in the United States. This results because visa violators delay returning home when their visas expire for fear they will not be permit ted entry into the United States again. Replacing temporary visas with permanent visas could reduce permanent settle ment by permitting visitors to return home without fear of being barred from entering the United States in the future.
Higher wages and altered visa policies are all a good deal more humane and less costly than the policies contemplated in the current legislative debate. I believe these will ultimate ly be more effective in preserving the economic and spiritual values of American life.
NOTES
1. For a discussion about the derivation of these estimates see Corwin (1984) .
2. For extensive discussion about the motives of immigrants see Piore (1979 
